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The creation of a single global financial market is perhaps the most important
component of the globalization process. One important prerequisite for the creation
of the global financial market is the harmonization of financial regulations between
national financial markets. In terms of policy prescription, the harmonization of regu-
lations has usually been perceived to be equivalent to dismantling controls on finan-
cial market activity. Thus, financial liberalization, which is aimed at removing regu-
lations on financial market activity, has become a central part of the financial global-
ization process.
During the last two decades, financial systems all over the world have under-
taken extensive financial liberalization programs. In the case of the EU, the creation
of the European Common Market led to the abolition of all remaining controls in the
late 1980s. For emerging market economies, financial liberalization programs were
usually implemented with the encouragement of the World Bank and the IMF, in
many cases as part of a broad structural adjustment program. Prior to the East
Asian crisis, it was widely believed that these liberalization efforts would bring sub-
stantial benefits by enhancing the efficiency of the financial sector, especially in terms
of allocating resources towards the most productive investment projects. However,
the reality has been much more complex, especially given the informational asym-
metries that accompany financial transactions of any kind. These asymmetries have
meant that where prudential regulation has been weak, moral hazard-type problems218 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
resulted in excessive risk-taking by financial institutions or investors, which then
led to financial fragility or banking crises.
While the medium-term costs of financial liberalization and greater integration
into international financial markets in terms of heightened fragility of the financial
system are now recognized, its longer-term benefits, albeit widely accepted, remain
the subject of an ongoing debate. Earlier empirical literature, which attempted to
capture these benefits by focusing on the cross-country relationship between the real
interest rate and economic growth or the efficiency of investment [Gelb, 1989], is now
believed to have been flawed. In this respect Stiglitz [1998] argues that these regres-
sions suffer from simultaneity and mis-specification problems. Arestis and
Demetriades [1997] reinforce these criticisms focusing on the causality and hetero-
geneity issues. On the basis of available empirical literature, it can safely be con-
cluded that considerable scope remains for further research into the channels through
which financial policies of various types, including financial liberalization, may af-
fect economic performance.
This paper provides a comprehensive empirical assessment of the effects of fi-
nancial policies, including financial liberalization, on the average productivity of capital
in fourteen economies. A broad literature has established that the financial sector in
an economy can be important in determining the average productivity of capital,
itself being one of the main channels of economic growth. Specifically, the screening
and monitoring of investment projects, in which the financial system routinely en-
gages, are likely to help boost the efficiency of investment [Pagano, 1993]. A growing
empirical literature in fact demonstrates that the development of the financial sys-
tem has positive effects on (i) the long-run rate of economic growth or (ii) the volume
or efficiency of investment [Fry, 1995]. However, the causal nature of this relation-
ship is now known to exhibit considerable variation across countries [Demetriades
and Hussein, 1996]. This indicates that institutional factors or policies may play a
critical role in determining how the process of financial development affects economic
growth [Arestis and Demetriades, 1997]. The importance of institutional factors is
confirmed by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache [1999], who demonstrate that institu-
tional quality is inversely related to the incidence of financial fragility that usually
follows episodes of financial liberalization. The relevance of financial liberalization
policies is highlighted by Demetriades and Luintel [1996; 1997; 2001] and Arestis et
al. [2002] who demonstrate that the direct effects of financial repression in some
developing countries are much larger than, and in some instances opposite to, those
emanating from changes in the real interest rate.
To assess the impact of financial policies on capital productivity, we constructed
a new data set on financial policies. A summary of financial policies used to construct
the new data set appears in the Appendix. These were collected either directly from
central banks or from official publications for a period of forty years. This exercise
itself constituted a major research effort. Specifically, we collected data from central
banks on several types of financial restraints, including restrictions on interest rates
and capital flows, reserve, and liquidity requirements and capital adequacy require-
ments. We estimate the effects of these policies on the aggregate productivity of the
capital stock using modern econometric methods that exploit both the time-series219 FINANCIAL POLICIES AND THE AGGREGATE PRODUCTIVITY
and cross-section dimensions of our data set. We find that financial development has
positive effects on productivity while the effects of financial policies vary consider-
ably across countries. Our findings demonstrate that financial liberalization is a much
more complex process than has been assumed by earlier literature and its effects on
key macroeconomic aggregates are ambiguous.
FINANCIAL POLICIES AND THE PRODUCTIVITY OF CAPITAL:
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
There are valid reasons why financial policies, including financial restraints, can
have important real effects, not only on financial development but also on the effi-
ciency of investment and, ultimately, the productivity of the capital stock. To start
with there are the seminal contributions of McKinnon [1973] and Shaw [1973], which
predict that interest rate controls and directed credit programs impede the process of
financial deepening, reducing both the volume and productivity of investment. These
types of models also predict that financial liberalization policies have positive effects
on the volume and efficiency of investment [Fry 1995; 1997]. In contrast, a growing
literature emphasizes financial market imperfections, including asymmetric infor-
mation and imperfect competition, that reaches conclusions contrary to the financial
liberalization hypothesis [Stiglitz, 1994; Caprio, 1994; Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz,
1996a; 2000].
Besides these macroeconomic approaches, additional models investigate the ef-
fects of financial regulation, especially capital adequacy requirements, on risk tak-
ing by banks [Kim and Santomero, 1988; Keeley and Furlong, 1990; Gennotte and
Pyle, 1991]. While these models do not explore the wider macroeconomic implica-
tions of these types of policies, all the recent episodes of financial fragility (for ex-
ample, Japan and East Asia) have vividly demonstrated that excessive risk-taking
by financial institutions can trigger severe macroeconomic downturns.
The empirical literature on the effects of financial policies is still in its infancy.
The banking literature tends to focus on the effects of capital adequacy on the behav-
ior of U.S. banks [Shrieves and Dahl, 1992; Hancock, Laing and Wilcox, 1995; Peek
and Rosengren, 1995]. The few macroeconometric studies that focus on a handful of
Asian economies, reveal that the effects of financial restraints may be very large but
vary considerably across countries [Demetriades and Luintel, 1997; Demetriades,
Devereux and Luintel, 1998]. Cross-country growth regressions indicate that finan-
cial restraints, with perhaps the exception of controls on capital outflows, may ham-
per economic performance [Rossi, 1999].
In the rest of this section we explore the likely macroeconomic effects of four
broad types of financial policies—interest rate restraints, restrictions on capital flows,
reserve and liquidity requirements and capital adequacy requirements. Financial
liberalization programs usually aim at removing or relaxing the first three types of
restraints. The fourth policy was in many cases introduced independently from fi-
nancial liberalization policies but has nevertheless been widely considered to be cru-
cial in reducing the risks associated with banking. As a result it constituted an im-
portant ingredient of banking reforms, especially in the 1980s.220 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Interest Rate Restraints
In McKinnon [1973] and Shaw’s [1973] framework, interest rate restraints ad-
versely affect the quality of investment by allowing low productivity projects to re-
main profitable. Hence, in this framework, interest rate liberalization, by improving
the allocation of credit towards more productive projects, will positively affect the
average productivity of capital. However, some authors have suggested that in the
presence of information asymmetries, liberalization of interest rates may not neces-
sarily lead to efficiency gains [Schiantarelli et al., 1994]. In the presence of implicit
deposit insurance, interest rate liberalization may encourage banks to take exces-
sive risks [McKinnon and Pill, 1997]. This form of moral hazard may manifest itself
in loans to highly risky, even speculative, activities such as real estate acquisitions
and stock purchases that may distort the allocation of resources away from produc-
tive activities [Caprio, 1994]. In such circumstances, interest rate liberalization will
not only reduce the average productivity of capital but may also lead to an increase in
bad debts. Equally important, financial liberalization, if accompanied by increased
competition, may erode the franchise value of banks [Caprio and Summers, 1994].
This exacerbates the problems of moral hazard in the banking system and encour-
ages looting behavior in banking, hence increasing the probability of financial crisis
[Akerlof and Romer, 1993].
In contrast, some types of financial restraints, including interest rate ceilings,
can in fact reduce the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection [Stiglitz, 1994].
In doing so, they may enhance the soundness of the domestic banking system, which
in turn may result in better allocation of resources [Arestis and Demetriades, 1997].
Hellman et al. [1996a; 1996b; 2000], argue that “financial restraint” policies create
rent opportunities in the financial sector, which enhance incentives for financial deep-
ening. These ideas are applied to deposit mobilization, which is crucial to many de-
veloping countries. By limiting deposit rates at below competitive equilibrium rates,
governments create rent opportunities, which the banking sector could utilize for
what is termed “educational advertising campaign,” a tool of non-price competition
which facilitates the mobilization of deposits, thereby enhancing financial deepening
in a system of low financial depth. The outcome of financial restraints under these
conditions is shown to be superior than under a free market, laissez-faire system.
A related point is that interest rate restrictions generate scope for rationing credit
in accordance to national priorities through directed credit programs. While in many
countries directed credit programs failed to achieve efficiency gains, some govern-
ments have been successful in channeling credit towards projects with high social
returns, which may have been unprofitable to finance with the higher interest rates
that usually prevail in liberalized credit markets [Calomiris and Himmelberg, 1994].
For example, in some East Asian countries the willingness to adapt credit policies to
changing circumstances and the use of contests based on export performance to guide
direct credit programs are believed to have contributed significantly to the effective-
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Restrictions on Capital Inflows
The impact of foreign investment restrictions on the average productivity of capi-
tal is expected to vary depending largely on the nature of the restrictions. Restric-
tions on foreign direct investment flows are likely to have a negative impact on the
average productivity of capital. Other than the fact that they may deter foreign in-
vestors, reducing the flow of ideas and technology transfer, restrictions aimed at
prohibiting capital from flowing to certain sectors may lead to a misallocation of
resources. It is now widely recognized that there may be more costs associated with
short-term capital inflows than benefits. While short-term capital inflows may, in
principle, supplement domestic saving and lead to higher levels of investment and
higher growth rates, this benefit is likely to be small in economies with already high
saving and investment ratios. The recent financial crisis in East Asia has demon-
strated that where it is not possible to invest short-term capital inflows in productive
activities, they could end up creating asset price bubbles, especially when they are
channelled into the stock market or the property market. During the early stages of
this process capital inflows lead to unsustainable asset price increases, fuelling the
euphoria of investors and leading to incorrect investment decisions (Arestis,
Demetriades and Fattouh, 2001]. Relative price distortions and resource
misallocations of this type are likely to impact the average productivity of capital
negatively; consequently restrictions on short-term capital flows may well prevent
this occurrence.
Reserve and Liquidity Requirements
Reserve and liquidity requirements are usually designed to ensure that banks
are sufficiently liquid to be able to meet day-to-day withdrawals by depositors. Mini-
mum reserve and liquidity requirements are particularly useful when money mar-
kets are not sufficiently deep or developed, which is frequently the case in developing
countries. But even in developed markets, reserve and liquidity requirements can
play a useful role, especially when there is imperfect information about a bank’s
solvency. In principle, a bank that is solvent, and may face an imbalance between
short-term payments and short-term income, can borrow through the interbank
market to close this liquidity gap. However, frequent liquidity shortages may create
solvency constraints. As a result, wholesale banks may refuse to provide an illiquid
bank with the necessary funds. Consequently, the illiquid bank may be forced to sell
long-term assets at distress prices, lowering the value of its assets. Hence, what
starts as a problem of liquidity may well be translated into a problem of insolvency
[Dewatripont and Tirole, 1993].
In contrast, advocates of financial liberalization consider reserve and liquidity
requirements as a tax on financial intermediation, which widens the spread between
deposit and loan interest rate and reduces the size of the financial system [Fry, 1995].
Hence, the abolition of reserve requirements, by increasing the size of financial inter-
mediation and removing the distortionary effects of the tax, is likely to result in a222 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
more efficient allocation of financial resources, which could help to increase the aver-
age productivity of capital. This argument is implicitly based on the assumption that
government revenue from reserve and liquidity requirements is used unproductively,
probably to finance government consumption. If these resources are instead used to
finance productive public investment, this conclusion may not follow. Much of the
literature on infrastructure, in fact, demonstrates that investment in public capital
increases the productivity of private capital [Aschauer, 1989; Lynde and Richmond,
1993; Nadiri and Mamuneas, 1994; Demetriades and Mamuneas, 2000].1 If this is
the case, reserve and liquidity requirements may well enhance the average produc-
tivity of capital.
Capital Adequacy Requirements
Regulators expect capital adequacy requirements first to reduce bank insolvency
risk or default, second to reduce the scope for moral hazard behavior by banks thereby
containing their tendency to take excessive risks, and finally to reduce the losses of
depositors in the event of bank failure [Wall and Peterson, 1996; Blum and Hellwig,
1995]. The theoretical literature is not unanimous about achieving the first and sec-
ond objectives [Berger, Herring, and Szego, 1995]. Using a mean-variance frame-
work, Kim and Santomero [1988] suggest that capital regulation may in fact increase
a bank’s portfolio risk and hence lead to an inefficient allocation of assets. Specifi-
cally, an involuntary reduction in leverage can be met by a change in the composition
of a bank’s portfolio towards more risky assets. Keeley and Furlong [1990] argue,
however, that the mean variance approach is inadequate to address the impact of
capital adequacy requirements. This is because the mean-variance framework fails
to recognize that the bank does not have full liability and that the value of deposit
insurance will increase as the bank’s leverage increases. When the model is adjusted
to take this feature into account, Keeley and Furlong [ibid.] show that higher capital
requirements would always result in lower risk-taking on behalf of the bank. How-
ever, in a different approach that incorporates Keeley and Furlong’s suggestion con-
cerning the value of deposit insurance and under the assumption that bank invest-
ments are subject to decreasing returns, Gennotte and Pyle [1991] show that capital
requirements increase the risk of banks’ portfolios. This offsets the benefits from
higher levels of capital, which may increase the probability of default and impair the
efficiency of bank lending.
Capital requirements also have other unintended consequences, which may have
adverse implications for the average productivity of capital. Blum and Hellwig [1995]
develop a model in which capital requirements amplify macroeconomic fluctuations
by increasing lending activity in good times and reducing it in bad times. Other stud-
ies have shown that capital adequacy ratios may contribute to a credit crunch by
reducing the amount of new loans to businesses [Hancock et al., 1995]. Finally, oth-
ers have argued that capital regulations may lead to allocative inefficiency by shift-
ing the use of traditional bank loans to off-balance sheet assets [Berger et al., 1995].223 FINANCIAL POLICIES AND THE AGGREGATE PRODUCTIVITY
ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY
Model Specification
Our methodology builds on recent work modelling the sources of productivity,2
and involves a number of empirical novelties. Instead of measuring total factor pro-
ductivity as a residual, we estimate it directly by modelling its sources. To this end
we assume that total factor productivity, among other things, can be ascribed to
financial development and financial policies. Another empirical novelty is the utili-
zation of recent econometric techniques that respect the time series properties of the
data while at the same time exploiting the cross section dimension of the data set.
Our method allows us to address the problem of inconsistent estimates in dynamic
heterogeneous panels identified by Pesaran and Smith [1995].
We estimate the following equation, in which some of the variables are lagged
one period to avoid possible simultaneity:
(1) Log (Yt /Kt) =  0 +  1 log Kt 1 +   2 log Lt 1 +  3 log Ft 1 +   Zt +  t
where Y, K and L stand for output, capital, and employment respectively, F is an
indicator of financial development and Z is a vector of financial sector policies, in-
cluding interest rate restraints, reserve and liquidity requirements, capital adequacy
requirements and capital account restrictions. This formulation essentially repre-
sents a generalized Cobb-Douglas production function, in which total factor produc-
tivity is modelled explicitly and is attributed to financial development and financial
policies. It nests the AK model as a special case in which  1 =  2 = 0. In general  1 (the
capital elasticity minus unity) is expected to be negative, while  2 (the elasticity of
employment) is expected to be positive. The degree of returns to scale is therefore
given by 1 +  1 +  2.
Tests for the Order of Integration in a Series
We first carry out unit root tests on each of the variables for the different coun-
tries i = 1,…, N using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) procedure to examine
orders of integration of the series. The ADF regression (here including a time trend)
is:
                                                                
                                                               i
(2)   xit =  i +  it +  i xi,t 1  +   ij   xit j + εij.
                                                        
                                                         j=1
Lag length (p) is set at a level to ensure that errors are white noise.
We then use panel unit root tests following the procedure proposed by Im, Pesaran
and Shin [1996]. This method allows for heterogeneity in the panel dynamics and
error variances across the N groups. Im, Pesaran, and Shin [1996] propose using a
group mean ADF t-test, which is distributed as a standard normal under the unit224 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
root null hypothesis. Specifically, the group mean ADF t-test is used to test the null
hypothesis that all the series in the panel have a unit root (Ho: i = 0 for all i) against
the stationary alternative that only a fraction N1/N of the series are stationary
(H1: i < 0 , i = 1, 2,…, N1‘,  i = 0, i = Ni + 1, N1 + 2, …, N). If the null hypothesis cannot
be rejected, then it is possible to conclude that the panel data series are I(1).
The group mean ADF t-bar statistics is given by
ZN tE t V a r t t NT NT NT =- () () / () ,
                                                                               
N
where  – tN,T = N 1 
– ti,T( i, i)
                                                                                     
 i=1
where N is the number of groups, T is the number of periods, and – ti,T ( i, i) is the
individual t-statistics for testing  i = 0 for all i. The relevant mean [E(– tNT)] and vari-
ance [ Var tNT () ] for a selection of sample sizes and lag structures for models in-
cluding intercepts and time trend are tabulated in Im, Pesaran, and Shin [1996]. Im,
Pesaran, and Shin [1996] show that Z–
  t statistic converges weakly to a standard nor-
mal distribution. Hence, to test whether a series in a panel contains a unit root, we
compare Z–
  t  statistics to the critical values from a N(0, 1) distribution.
Estimation Method
Equation (1) is estimated using the Dynamic OLS/GLS (DOLS) single equation
cointegration estimator [Phillips, 1991; Phillips and Loretan, 1991; Saikkonen, 1991],
generalized by Stock and Watson [1993] to cases where regressors are not integrated
of the same order. Thus, DOLS estimation allows variables integrated of order d, for
d > 1, to be combined with I(1) variables in the cointegrating vector. Under these
more generalized conditions, Stock and Watson show that DOLS/DGLS are asymp-
totically efficient, having an asymptotic distribution that is a random mixture of
normals and producing Wald test statistics with asymptotic chi-squared null distri-
butions. Furthermore, Stock and Watson provide evidence from a Monte Carlo simu-
lation showing that DOLS and DGLS perform well in finite samples relative to other
asymptotically efficient estimators. In practical terms, the estimation of the average
productivity equation by DOLS involves adding leads and lags of the first [second]
differences of the I(1) [I(2)] regressors to equation (1). Thus, all the nuisance param-
eters, which represent short-run dynamics, are I(0) and are, by construction,
uncorrelated with the error term of the equation [Stock and Watson, 1993]. This
procedure corrects for the possible endogeneity of the non-stationary regressors, and
gives estimates of the cointegrating vector which are asymptotically efficient.3
The equation is estimated simultaneously for all the countries in our data set by
the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method [Zellner, 1963]. Thus, we exploit
any contemporaneous correlation of the error terms across equations, which would
reflect productivity shocks common to all countries. All variables and nuisance pa-
rameters corresponding to the dynamic terms are allowed to vary across countries.225 FINANCIAL POLICIES AND THE AGGREGATE PRODUCTIVITY
The SUR system is estimated using Feasible GLS. Using the estimates from the
SUR estimation, we then perform unit root tests on the cointegrating vector (exclud-
ing the nuisance parameters). The lag lengths for the ADF tests are chosen to ensure
that the error terms are white noise. Finally, we construct the panel cointegration
statistic and compare it to the critical values given by Pedroni [1998].
This method of exploiting the cross-section dimension of the data set while re-
specting the time-series properties of the data, without aggregating or pooling, al-
lows us to address the problem of inconsistent estimates in dynamic heterogeneous
panels identified by Pesaran and Smith [1995]. There are also clear advantages over
the cross-section growth regressions where all long-run and dynamic parameters as
well as the intercept are assumed identical across countries. Finally, the use of DOLS
as opposed to other cointegration estimators is justified by recent work by Kao and
Chiang [1997], which shows that it performs better than other single-equation
cointegration estimators in panels of up to size N = 20.
FINANCIAL POLICIES DATA SET
The financial policies data set used for this analysis has been uniquely constructed
from information available in the Central Bank annual reports from each country
from 1955 to 1996. The data we gathered comprise controls and regulations concern-
ing the operation of domestic financial intermediaries as well as restrictions on in-
ward and outward flows of capital. Specifically, we extracted information relating to
interest rate restraints, reserve and liquidity requirements, regulations on capital
adequacy, and restrictions on the flow of capital. The details on capital flow regula-
tions were further enhanced by the IMF annual report on Exchange Controls and
Capital Flows.
The choice of countries was driven by the objective of covering a broad spectrum
of experiences in relation to economic development. We initially collected data on the
financial policies of twenty-four countries. However, for ten of these countries the
data is fragmented and/or limited and cannot, therefore, be used for time-series esti-
mations. Consequently, these data constraints limited the number of countries that
could be used for estimation purposes to fourteen, of which six could be considered
developing. Specifically, the developed countries in our sample are Australia, Fin-
land, France, Germany, New Zealand, Sweden, the United States, and the UK. The
developing countries are Greece, Turkey, the Philippines, Thailand, Korea, and India.
Table 1A summarizes the main financial policies for our sample of countries. It
also provides the basis for the construction of four quantitative summary measures
of financial policies. Below we provide a descriptive account of these policies.
Interest Rate Restraints
Table 1A suggests that developed countries have different experiences when it
comes to interest rate liberalization. The UK is the only country in our sample that
did not resort to interest rate controls. United States resorted only to deposit rate
controls, while Finland imposed controls on lending rates. The rest of the countries in
our sample imposed both types of controls. The timing of liberalization also differs226 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
substantially across countries. While Germany abolished controls on lending and
deposit rates in the late 1960s, it is not until the late 1970s and mid-1980s that the
rest of the countries underwent financial liberalization, which indicates that this is a
relatively recent phenomenon, even in developed countries. Financial liberalization
was also not homogenous across countries. In Germany and New Zealand controls on
lending and deposit rates were abolished simultaneously. In Australia and Sweden,
deposit rates were liberalized first followed by lending rates, while in France it was
the other way around. The pace of liberalization also differs considerably across coun-
tries. While countries such as New Zealand and Australia opted for rapid financial
liberalization, other countries such as France and Sweden resorted to a more gradual
approach. In the developing world, the experiences across countries also differ sub-
stantially. In Turkey, Thailand and Philippines, financial liberalization occurred fast
while it was much slower in Korea and Greece. It is interesting to note that in few
countries (New Zealand, Turkey and India), financial liberalization did not run
smoothly, and few reversed reforms.
Liquidity Requirements
The countries in the sample have different experiences regarding liquidity re-
quirements. Finland, the United States, and New Zealand had no formal liquidity
ratios throughout the sample period. At the other end of the spectrum, Germany and
France, until recently, applied very high liquidity ratios. By the early 1990s, how-
ever, as Table 1A shows, most countries in our sample had abolished liquidity ratios
with the exception of France, where credit institutions are required to cover their
liabilities by at least an equivalent amount of liquid assets, and Australia, where
banks must maintain a high quality of liquid assets and government securities equiva-
lent to 12 percent of total liabilities. In the second group of countries, the Philippines,
Korea, and Turkey did not impose any formal liquidity ratios. On the other hand,
India significantly increased its liquidity ratios to as high as 38.5 percent in the
1980s and the 1990s. Greece also resorted heavily to liquidity requirements in the
1980s; banks there were required to invest a certain fraction of their total deposits in
short term government bonds. However, these requirements were abolished in 1993.
Reserve Requirements
All the countries in our sample have, at some stage, used reserve requirements
for the conduct of monetary policy. However, it is interesting to note that in a few
countries such as Sweden, New Zealand, and the UK, cash reserve requirements
were completely abolished in the mid-1980s and early 1990s. In France and Austra-
lia, reserve requirements were reduced to very low levels (1 percent). This raises
some interesting questions about the ability of a country to conduct monetary policy
without reserve requirements and the impact of such developments on short-term
interest rates [Sellon and Weiner, 1996]. Reserve requirements were in general higher
in the group of developing countries than in the group of developed countries. Until
1995, Turkey, Greece, the Philippines, Korea, and India imposed very high reserve227 FINANCIAL POLICIES AND THE AGGREGATE PRODUCTIVITY
requirements although recently Greece and Korea have lowered their reserve re-
quirements considerably. The only exception is Thailand, where reserve requirements
were set at very low levels throughout the sample period.
Restrictions on Capital Inflows
Table 1A indicates that many developed countries in the early 1980s had con-
trols on capital inflows. The only two exceptions were Germany, which lifted most
controls in 1973, and United States, which in 1974 abolished the limited controls
imposed in the 1960s. In the UK, capital controls were relaxed in 1979. For the re-
maining economies in the sample, capital account liberalization efforts did not take
place until the mid-1980s and were only completed in the 1990s. For instance, in
Finland capital controls were abolished only during 1991-93. In Sweden and France,
capital controls were relaxed only in 1990. These examples clearly suggest that abo-
lition of restrictions on capital inflow is a very recent phenomenon in the developed
world. In the developing countries group, most restrictions on capital inflows were
also relaxed in the 1990s, except for India where a few restrictions are still in place.
Capital Adequacy Requirements
By 1993, all countries in the sample had adopted the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) capital requirements. It is interesting to note though that it is not
until the 1980s that monetary authorities in the developed world embarked on set-
ting specific guidelines for banks’ capital ratios. For instance, until 1983, the Austra-
lian monetary authorities did not have any statutory power to set specific guidelines
for capital ratios. In New Zealand, the Reserve Bank’s role in prudential regulation
was formalized only in 1986. In the United States, the UK and France, the informal
system of monitoring capital ratios was replaced by a more formal system only in the
early 1980s. In Finland, capital adequacy requirements were in place, but banks
were granted temporary exemption, which reduced capital ratios to very low levels.
The only exceptions to this general trend are Germany and Turkey, which enforced
strict rules regarding banks’ capital adequacy. Throughout the sample period, the
German authorities required that a bank’s loans and participation not exceed 18
times its liable capital. In Turkey, capital adequacy requirements had been in opera-
tion since 1962. The only country in the sample still with no formal capital adequacy
requirements is the Philippines.
MEASUREMENT AND DATA SOURCES
In this section we explain the construction of each of the variables used in the
estimation of equation (1). These variables comprise the average productivity of capi-
tal, capital stock, employment, financial development, and a vector of financial policy
variables. The number of policy variables included in this vector was determined
through a combination of statistical criteria and economic reasoning. Statistical cri-
teria included the prevention of multicollinearity, which suggested keeping the num-228 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
ber of policy variables as low as possible. Economic reasoning allowed lumping con-
trols on deposit and lending rates with reserve requirements on different types of
bank deposits. Strong positive correlations between variables suggested lumping
various types of restrictions on capital flows with reserve and liquidity requirements.
We were thus left with four summary measures of financial policies, with relatively
low correlations between them.
The macroeconomic variables were constructed from data available from Inter-
national Financial Statistics (IMF) and from the World Bank data set compiled by
Nehru and Dareshwar [1993]. These data sources allow us to construct the average
productivity of capital and the financial development variable (the ratio of nominal
claims on the private sector to GDP). We measure the average productivity of capital
by the ratio of the flow of current output to capital stock. We construct the measure
using the real GDP and capital stock series available from 1963 to 1990 from the
World Bank Database as compiled by Nehru et al. [1993]. Capital stock figures from
1991 to 1995 were constructed, following the perpetual inventory method assuming
a depreciation rate of 4 percent and up-rating the price of capital goods in line with
the GDP deflator. Investment and GDP data were obtained from International Fi-
nancial Statistics [CD-ROM, 1998, 6]. Data on employment were obtained from the
International Labor Statistics [various issues].4 Financial development is measured
by the ratio of nominal claims on private sector to nominal GDP. The data source for
both these variables is International Financial Statistics [ibid., 6].
We construct four summary policy variables, namely interest rate restraints (IRC),
reserve and liquidity requirements (RR), capital adequacy requirements (KAD) and
restrictions on capital inflows (CC). The first policy variable—interest rate restraints—
is an unweighted average of lending rate and deposit rate control dummies (which
take the value of 1 if a control is present, 0 otherwise). The second policy variable—
reserve and liquidity requirements—is a weighted average of the first two principal
components of reserve requirements on demand, saving and time deposits and li-
quidity ratios.5 The weights chosen correspond to the relative variance of each com-
ponent. For each country, the resulting index is positively correlated with the under-
lying variables.
The third policy variable—capital adequacy requirements—is constructed from
data collected mainly from central bank reports. In years when there were no formal
minimum capital adequacy standards in effect, the variable takes the value of zero.6
It is important to note that the regulatory definition of capital has changed over the
years in many countries. This would have implications for capital adequacy even
during periods when there have been no changes in capital adequacy requirements.7
However, the lack of relevant data did not allow us to adjust the series to changes in
the regulatory definition of capital.
The fourth policy variable is an arithmetic average of the dummy for restrictions
on inward portfolio investment and the dummy for inward foreign direct investment.
These dummies are constructed by collecting information on these policies from vari-
ous sources, mainly the IMF Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions [various is-
sues].229 FINANCIAL POLICIES AND THE AGGREGATE PRODUCTIVITY
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We report unit root tests for the various variables for the two groups of countries:
developed and developing ones. The unit root tests on the level of the series clearly
show that the null of a unit root in the level of the series cannot be rejected for any of
the fourteen countries (Table 1), while the same hypothesis is strongly rejected for
the first-differenced level series at the 1 percent level of significance, except for capi-
tal stock where we cannot reject the null of a unit root in the first difference of the
capital stock series (Table 2). The panel statistic clearly confirms that all variables
are integrated of order one, except for the capital stock series, which was found to be
I(2).
The next step in our empirical investigation involves applying the DOLS estima-
tor to estimate the average productivity equation. The equation is estimated sepa-
rately for each country, and the residuals of the regression are subjected to a test to
ascertain whether the SUR technique, which assumes dependence among the equa-
tions, should also be utilized. We therefore formally test the null hypothesis that the
TABLE 1
Unit Root Tests For Level of Series (1955-1996)
Developed Countries   LK   LL LFD IRC RR KAD   CC
Australia  0.033  1.416  0.934  1.813  1.521  1.481  2.464
Finland 2.300  0.048  1.115  1.742  1.450  0.983  1.943
France  1.667  1.840  0.943  2.426  1.454  2.092  0.785
Germany  1.801  2.018  2.567  1.592  1.597  2.177  1.917
New Zealand  0.853  2.660  0.328  3.803  2.679  0.936  1.754
Sweden  0.864  0.266  2.122  2.028  1.194  2.448  2.028
UK  1.476  2.551  1.644 —  2.093  1.507  2.294
United States  1.205  2.692  3.713  2.002  2.131  1.979  2.053
Panel Statistic          0.699          1.686          1.670          2.200          1.764          1.700          1.904
Developing Countries    LK    LL LFD IRC RR KAD     CC
Greece  1.855  1.902  0.210  1.322  0.841  1.908  0.995
Turkey 0.177  1.867  2.668  2.980  0.624  0.162  3.057
Philippines  2.601  3.207  2.338  1.577  2.329 —  1.239
Thailand  2.953  2.982  2.969 0.096  2.403 —  0.523
Korea 0.105  1.517  1.275  2.238 — —  0.873
India  3.082  0.307  3.693  1.374  2.444 —  1.491
Panel Statistic          1.701          1.963          2.192          1.565          1.728          1.035          1.363
1. LK  is the logarithm of the capital stock employed; LL is the logarithm of the number of workers
employed; LFD is the logarithm of the ratio of nominal claims on private sector to nominal GDP; IRC is
the index of interest rate controls; RR is the index of liquidity and reserve requirements; KAD is an
index of capital adequacy requirements; CC is an index of restrictions on capital inflows.
2. Critical values of Panel Statistic with time trend for the developed countries group: 1 percent = 2.90,
5 percent = 2.68; 10 percent= 2.57. [Im, Pesaran and Smith, 1996].
3. Critical values of Panel Statistic with time trend for the developing countries group: 1 percent = 2.93,
5 percent = 2.69; 10 percent =  2.57. [Im, Pesaran and Smith, 1996].230 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
TABLE 2
Unit Root Tests For Differences of Series
Developed Countries          LK          2LK          LL          LFD          IRC          RR          KAD          CC
Australia          0.894          5.221          5.833          4.420          6.573          6.503          6.476          6.349
Finland          1.559          3.999          3.340          2.877          6.403          4.118          6.340          6.695
France 0.559          4.528          6.059          5.334          6.538          6.689          6.553          5.791
Germany          1.019          6.063          5.673          6.057          6.403          6.664          6.527          6.043
New Zealand          2.354          4.782          4.788          4.343          5.712          8.614          6.437          5.811
Sweden 0.208          4.230          4.453          5.543          6.573          6.573          8.473          6.960
UK          0.645          4.687          4.656          4.257 —          6.472          6.547          6.759
United States          2.677          5.875          5.603          6.108          6.403          7.040          6.503          6.245
Panel Statistic          1.047          4.923          5.050          4.867          6.372          6.584          6.732          6.331
Developing Countries          LK          2LK          LL          LFD          IRC          RR          KAD          CC
Greece          0.897          5.131          5.846          4.065          5.789          4.078          5.855          5.534
Turkey          0.105          5.337          5.975          4.673          5.595          5.365          5.142          7.236
Phillipines          1.276          3.681          5.551          3.396          4.140          4.255 —          5.814
Thailand          1.381          4.442          6.161          3.505          5.000          7.869 —          4.827
Korea          2.350          3.867          4.590          3.100          5.361 — —          6.198
India          1.792          4.714          3.694          9.217          5.082          5.847 —          5.855
Panel Statistic          1.300          4.528          5.302          4.659          5.161          5.482          5.498          5.910
See notes from Table 1.
covariance matrix is diagonal. If we accept the null hypothesis, OLS is efficient and
there are no efficiency gains in using SUR. We use the Lagrange multiplier test sug-
gested by Breusch and Pagan [1980], which is composed of the sum of the squared
correlation coefficients multiplied by the number of observations. This statistic is
asymptotically distributed as chi squared with M(M – 1)/2 degrees of freedom where
M is the number of countries included in the panel. According to this statistic, the
hypothesis that the covariance matrix is diagonal can be rejected at the 1 percent
level.8 This indicates that significant efficiency gains can be achieved from exploiting
the contemporaneous correlation across countries using SUR.
The results of the DOLS regression using the SUR technique are presented in
Tables 3 and 4. According to the ADF statistic, individual cointegrating vectors show
a high degree of cointegration with the exception of Finland in the developed econo-
mies group and Turkey in the developing economies group. When considering the
panel as a whole, the evidence of cointegration is very strong in the developed econo-
mies group, but weaker in the developing economies group for which we cannot reject
the null of a unit root.
Tables 3 and 4 also report the estimated coefficients in each cointegrating vector.
The estimated coefficients of the logarithm of the capital variable are reasonable and
are precisely estimated, as indicated by the low standard errors. The implied capital
stock elasticities take plausible values, ranging from 0.47 for the UK to 0.91 for Fin-
land. With perhaps the exception of India, the estimated employment elasticities are
also sensible, even though they are imprecisely estimated in the case of Turkey and231 FINANCIAL POLICIES AND THE AGGREGATE PRODUCTIVITY
TABLE 3
Cointegration Analysis for Developed Countries  (1955-1996)
Country Cons LK LL LFD IRC RR KAD CC ADF
Australia 4.716a          0.256a 0.126a 0.038a 0.032a 0.018a 0.006a          0.068a          5.110
0.422 0.024 0.034 0.021 0.010 0.005 0.002 0.013
Finland 0.769          0.087a 0.031 0.105b 0.005 0.008a 0.006b 0.100a          2.761
0.578 0.028 0.103 0.059 0.015 0.003 0.003 0.022
France 11.796a          0.451a 0.068a 0.002          0.169a 0.008a 0.026a 0.105a          3.878
0.495 0.017 0.007 0.012 0.017 0.001 0.003 0.014
Germany 10.018a          0.416a 0.118a 0.325a 0.062a 0.036a          0.011a          0.097a          3.477
1.093 0.041 0.023 0.048 0.008 0.002 0.001 0.022
New Zealand 5.219a          0.431a 0.648a 0.028 0.030a          0.021a          0.006a 0.339a          4.034
0.712 0.062 0.128 0.024 0.007 0.001 0.002 0.024
Sweden 8.058a          0.488a 0.581a 0.081a          0.016 0.041a 0.005a          0.088a          3.979
0.624 0.040 0.085 0.025 0.009 0.016 0.002 0.021
UK 11.672a          0.533a 0.214a 0.086a —          0.003          0.014          0.058a          5.721
1.113a 0.022 0.103 0.009 0.003 0.014 0.028
United States 7.464a          0.417a 0.347a 0.413a 0.033a 0.003 -0.002          0.032          4.350
3.129 0.163 0.176 0.105 0.013 0.005 0.002 0.051
Panel Statistic          4.163
See note 1 from Table 1.
2. The method of estimation is DOLS [Stock and Watson, 1993]. Given the small number of observations,
to avoid over-parameterization we only retain significant lags and leads [Inder, 1995].
3.  ADF is the augmented Dickey Fuller test on the residuals of the cointegrating vector excluding the
nuisance parameters.
4. Critical values for the panel cointegration statistic without time trend is          3.795 [Pedroni,1998].
a. Significant at the 1 percent level;
b. Significant at the 5 percent level.
TABLE 4
Cointegration Analysis for Developing Countries (1955-1996)
Country Cons LK LL LFD IRC RR KAD CC ADF
Greece 2.053          0.321a 0.449b 0.073          0.065a          0.005          0.098a 0.007          3.802
4.139 0.019 0.276 0.033 0.024 0.005 0.021 0.030
Turkey 6.145a          0.269 0.167 0.200a 0.100a 0.010 0.773a          0.102a          2.002
0.977 0.047 0.138 0.060 0.024 0.006 0.064 0.051
Philippines 4.833a          0.243a 0.107 0.085a 0.181a 0.002 — 0.088a          3.460
0.984 0.061 0.104 0.022 0.032 0.008 0.048
Thailand 9.332a          0.504a 0.445a 0.160a          0.233a          0.015 — 0.795a          3.371
1.577 0.064 0.108 0.068 0.053          0.015 0.304
Korea 6.145a          0.514a 0.565b 0.084a 0.007 — —          0.176a          3.442
0.755 0.106 0.342 0.040 0.164 0.055
India 2.001a          0.363a 0.801a 0.002          0.139a          0.013 —          0.126a          3.679
0.827 0.067 0.179 0.011 0.024 0.010 0.045
Panel Statistic          3.292
See notes 1, 2, and 3 from Table 3.
4.  Critical values for Panel Cointegration statistic without time trend is –3.531 [Pedroni,1998].
a. Significant at the 1 percent level.
b. Significant at the 5 percent level.232 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
the Philippines. These elasticities range from 0.03 for Finland to 0.80 for India. The
weaknesses in some of the developing country estimates probably reflect the poor
quality of the employment data. Nonetheless, partly because the implied capital stock
elasticities are plausible, the implied degree of returns to scale takes reasonable val-
ues, ranging from 0.62 for France to 1.44 for India. Most of the developed countries
exhibit returns to scale that are below unity. For example, the implied degree of
returns to scale for the UK is 0.68 and 0.93 for the United States. On the other hand,
New Zealand and Sweden’s are 1.22 and 1.09 respectively. The developing econo-
mies, except fo India exhibit implied returns to scale in the range of 0.86-1.12, which
appear reasonable.
Tables 3 and 4 also reveal that in most countries the financial development indi-
cator enters significantly with the expected positive sign. The exceptions are France
and New Zealand in the developed group and Greece and India in the developing
group, where although the financial development indicator has the expected sign it is
not significant at the conventional levels.
As to financial policies, the results are generally mixed. Starting with interest
rate restraints, these are insignificant in the case of Finland and Sweden. Impor-
tantly, in Australia, Germany, New Zealand and the United States, interest rate
restraints enter with a positive sign and are statistically significant. On the other
hand, in France they appear to have a negative impact on the average productivity of
capital. It is important to note here that interest rate restraints in France were more
severe than in other developed countries, which may be a factor that helps to explain
why they had a negative impact. The effects of interest rate restraints are also mixed
in the developing economies group. Specifically, we find that interest rate restraints
have a negative impact on average productivity of capital in Greece, India, and Thai-
land, while they have a positive impact in Turkey and Philippines.
The impact of reserve and liquidity requirements also varies across countries.
Reserve requirements enter significantly with a positive sign in almost all countries
except for New Zealand where the impact is negative, and in the UK and the United
States where reserve requirements were found to have no significant impact on the
average productivity of capital. Interestingly, reserve requirements are insignificant
in all countries of the developing economies group. The impact of capital adequacy
requirements is also not homogenous across countries. In many countries such as
Australia, Finland, France, Sweden, and Turkey, capital adequacy requirements seem
to have contributed positively to the average productivity of capital. On the other
hand, in countries like New Zealand, Greece, and Germany capital adequacy ad-
versely affected the productivity of capital. In the case of Germany, this result can be
partly explained by the excessive requirements that were imposed in 1974 on banks
as a reaction to the crash of the Herstat Bank. Interestingly, in the UK and the
United States, capital adequacy ratios are not significant. The evidence of the impact
of capital inflow restrictions on average productivity is again mixed. In the UK, Swe-
den, Germany, and Australia, the dummy for capital inflows enters significantly with
a negative sign. On the other hand, in Finland, New Zealand, and France, this indi-
cator enters positively. In the developing group, the evidence is also mixed. The indi-
cator enters negatively in Korea, India, and Turkey, but positively in the case of233 FINANCIAL POLICIES AND THE AGGREGATE PRODUCTIVITY
Philippines and Thailand. In the latter country, this result is not surprising since
most of the restrictions were imposed on short-term flows whereas FDI flows were
liberalized from the early 1970s.
Taken together these results suggest quite clearly that the impact of financial
policies varies considerably across countries. This is confirmed by testing for the equal-
ity of coefficients across equations using the Wald statistic. As Table 5 clearly sug-
gests, in the case of developed countries, we reject the null hypothesis that coeffi-
cients are equal across equations. In the developing group, we obtain similar results,
except for reserve requirements where the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal
across equations cannot be rejected at conventional levels. The differences in the
effects of financial policies probably reflect institutional differences across countries,
including the strength of banking supervision and regulation, the structure of the
banking system and its relationship to industry and government. These institutions
are likely to influence the implementation of financial policies, which may be a deci-
sive factor in policy effectiveness. In many developing countries, for example, finan-
cial restraints may be imposed but not enforced—or enforced selectively—in the sense
that any penalties imposed on institutions that do not adhere to them are ineffective.
In developed economies, there are important differences between bank-based and
capital-market-based financial systems, which may well account for why certain poli-
cies work differently [Arestis, Demetriades and Luintel, 2001].
Finally, it is important to note that our findings fail to provide adequate support
for the financial liberalization thesis. Specifically, interest rate restraints and re-
serve requirements, which tend to be the focus of financial liberalization programs,
TABLE 5
















See note 1 from Table 2.
1. The null hypothesis: coefficients are equal across equations. We use the Wald statistic to test the null
hypothesis.
2.  p-values of the Wald statistic given below coefficients.234 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
are found to positively impact the productivity of capital in many countries. Further-
more, restrictions on capital inflows are found to have positive effects in five coun-
tries and negative effects in seven. These findings provide considerable empirical
support to the argument that some form of financial restraints may indeed enhance
economic efficiency. Stiglitz is, thus, justified when he argues,
…there are a host of regulations, including restrictions on interest
rates or lending to certain sectors (such as speculative real estate),
that may enhance the stability of the financial system and thereby
increase the efficiency of the economy. Although there may be a trade
off between short-run efficiency and this stability, the costs of insta-
bility are so great that long run gains to the economy more than off-
set any short term losses… [1998, 33].
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper provides a novel assessment of the effects of several types of financial
policies on the average productivity of capital in fourteen countries. Specifically, it
uses a new data set on financial restraints, capital adequacy requirements and re-
strictions on capital flows in these countries, for a period of forty years, the collection
of which represented a major research effort. It utilizes modern panel time-series
methods to examine the effects of these policies on the productivity of capital, con-
trolling for financial development, employment and capital. Our empirical findings
suggest that the effects of these policies vary considerably across countries, probably
reflecting institutional differences. They also demonstrate that the main predictions
of the financial liberalization literature do not receive adequate empirical support, a
result that may reflect the prevalence of financial market imperfections. In contrast,
our findings provide significant support to the thesis, currently gaining increasing
support among international policymakers, that some form of financial restraints
may indeed have positive effects on economic efficiency.
Several fruitful avenues for further research emerge from our findings. One plau-
sible conjecture is that financial restraints positively affect productivity where insti-
tutional quality, such as prudential regulation and supervision, is weak. To test this
conjecture one would require data on the quality of the regulatory regime, a chal-
lenging but worthwhile endeavor. Other institutional quality indicators, such as the
quality of legal rules and law enforcement, have been used successfully in relation to
the development of capital markets [La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanas, and Vishny, 1997].
There are further under-researched theoretical aspects still to be explored with re-
spect to the relationship investigated in this study, the most promising of which re-
lates to the interaction between prudential and monetary control. Consequently, fur-
ther work on these, and related issues, is likely to produce useful insights into the
effectiveness of financial liberalization. This in its turn would be invaluable to the
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NOTES
We acknowledge financial support from the ESRC (Grant R000236463). We would like to thank
David Mayes for providing us with vital links to the central banks of Finland, Sweden, Canada, and
Austria. We would also like to thank Jean-Bernard Chatelain for providing us with information from
the Bank of France. We are also thankful to Clare Kelly for collecting some of the data from central
bank reports.
1. The precise estimates of these effects vary considerably depending on methods and data used.
2. See, for example, Demetriades, Devereux and Luintel [1998] for a relevant application in East Asia.
3. We thank Pentti Saikkonen for clarifying this point.
4. Due to data unavailability in few countries (Thailand, Sweden, India, Turkey), the labor series was
extrapolated using the number of workers from the Penn World Table Data set adjusted for by the
ratio of number of workers obtained from ILO to the number of workers obtained from Penn World
Table Data set.
5. An exception is France where liquidity ratios were found highly correlated with capital adequacy
requirements rather than reserve requirements.
6. Even when there were no formal capital adequacy requirements, in most of these countries there
were some regulations aimed at assessing the riskiness of an institution’s loans and other assets.
7. We are grateful to Fred Daniel of the Bank of Canada for this remark.
8. The test statistic is 100.66 for the group of developed countries. The critical value for 1 percent level
of significance is 48.28. The test statistic is 71.56 for the group of developing countries. The critical
value for 1 percent level of significance is 30.58.
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